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An Evaluation of Changes in the Medical Standard of Care
I.

INTRODUCTION

When a layman is charged with negligence, his conduct is
compared with the conduct to be expected from that familiar fictional
person-the reasonable and prudent man under the same or similar
circumstances.' The defendant's special knowledge or skill is only one
of the circumstances to be considered; another is the customary
practice of those similarly situated. In the field of medical negligence,
however, the conduct of other physicians becomes extremely important.
The standard of care to which doctors will be held is determined to a
large extent by fellow practitioners. The standard of care for medical
practitioners has been expressed as follows:
a reasonable . . . or ordinary degree of skill and learning; . . . commonly

possessed and exercised by members of the profession . . . who are of the same
school or system as the defendant . . . and who practice in the same or similar
localities;. . . and exercise of the defendant's good judgment.'

This medical standard, like the reasonable and prudent man standard,
is said to be objective. However, subjective elements, such as
evaluations of expert opinion and mistake of judgment, are decided by
3
the trier of fact.
In malpractice cases expert testimony, directed toward the
standard of care, is ordinarily required before the negligence issue is
allowed to go to the jury.4 The expert medical witness requirement is
peculiar to the medical malpractice case. Once the requirement is met,
the jury is permitted to resolve conflicts of expert opinion and
determine the proper standard of conduct. 5
Although the articulated medical standard of care has remained
basically unchanged, many courts have made significant alterations in
the application of the standard. The purpose of this Note is to examine
some of the existing court rules and their modifications pertaining to
the medical standard of care. The areas of concentration are the
locality rules, the medical custom standard, and the mistake of
judgment defense. All three are particularly viable doctrines in the
1. See W. PROSSER, TORTS § 32, at 153 (3d ed. 1964); McCoid, The Care Required of
Medical Practitioners, 12 VAND. L. REV. 549, 558 (1959); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS §§ 295A, 299A (1965).
2. McCoid, supra note 1, at 559.
3. See I D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 8.04, at 203 (1969).
4.
5.

See B. SHARTEL & M. PLANT, THE LAW OF MEDICAL PRACTICE § 3-16, at 130 (1959).
See F. HARPER & F. JAMES, TORTS § 17.1, at 968-69 (1956).
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medical malpractice arena, and indications of change have appeared
with respect to each. Such factors 'as better and more standardized
medical training, advanced means of communication and
transportation, and more knowledge of medical affairs on the part of
laymen have been the basis for arguments in favor of change.
Although the three elements of the standard of care under
consideration are discussed separately, they are interrelated to some
extent. For example, a broadening of the locality rule necessarily
affects the customary practice rule since the custom might be altered
as the geographical boundaries are expanded; determination of whether
there is an honest mistake of judgment rather than negligence will be
affected by the applicabl6 locality and customary practice rules.
II.

LOCALITY RULE

The standard of care owed patients by medical practitioners has
been consistently articulated with reference to the geographical area in
which the physician practices. The original locality rule which set the
standard as that in the practitioner's local community has been
broadened in varying degrees.
A.

The TraditionalRule

Under the original locality rule the physician's actions are
measured exclusively by the standard of care evidenced by other
physicians in the same locality.' This rule was established by the courts
in the early days because of the generally poor and diversified training
that doctors received and because the country doctor, due to a lack of
efficient means of transportation and communication, could not be
expected to keep abreast of medical advances.7 The rural physician also
lacked the sophisticated equipment available to his city brother. The
logical basis of this rule, therefore, was not to require the county
practitioner to meet the same standard of care as the city doctor who
had access to a metropolitan hospital and its facilities for both
treatment and learning. It should be noted that although some of these
6. See generally 1 MEDICAL MALPRACTICE VII-R-8 (S. Schreiber ed. 1967); W. PROSSER,
supra note 1, at 166-67; RESTATEmENT, supra note 1, § 299A, comment g, at 75; McCoid, supra

note 1,at 569.
7.

E.g., Small v. Howard, 128 Mass. 131, 35 Am. R. 363 (1880). This often cited case

justifies the locality rule on the basis of the rural conditions existing in the 19th century. It was
recently overruled in Brune v. Belinkkoff, 354 Mass. 102, 235 N.E.2d 793 (1968), discussed in text

accompanying notes 56-57 infra.
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same reasons might have been applicable to other professions, the
locality rule has been used only with regard to the medical profession.8
The significance of the locality rule is apparent during the trial
when the standard of care against which the physician's conduct will
be measured must be established by another doctor. If the plaintiff is
unable to present expert testimony that establishes the local standard
from which the defendant's conduct deviated, a verdict will ordinarily
be directed against him If the case does go to the jury, the judge's
instruction will indicate that the locality rule shall be applied.
Application of the "same locality" rule has resulted in two
practical difficulties. ° First, there is the problem of securing physicians
from the same locality who are qualified and willing to testify about
the local standard of care. Secondly, there is the concern that a small
group of doctors can, by their carelessness, establish an inferior local
standard of care. Nevertheless, a number of states still follow the
"same locality" rule, and the country doctor remains well protected."
B.

Expansion to a Similar Locality

Some courts have indicated that the "same locality" rule is too
restrictive. In these jurisdictions, the rule was broadened to one that
measures the physician's conduct by the standard practice of physicians
in the same or a similar locality or community. 2 Use of the "same or
similar locality" rule reduces to some extent the difficulties presented
by the "same- locality" rule. When the plaintiff can look to other
localities for expert witnesses he is more likely to find a physician who
is willing to testify as to the standard of care because the expert would
8. With regard to lawyers, the courts usually speak of the ordinary or normal lawyer, and
there is little reference to lawyers in a same or similar community. See Wade, The Attorney's
Liabilityfor Negligence, 12 VAND. L. REV. 755, 762-63 (1959). A reference to locality was made,
however, in Pitt v. Yalden, 98 Eng. Rep. 74, 75 (K.B. 1767), where Lord Mansfield said that
"they were country attornies; and might not, and probably did not know that this point was
settled here above."
See Pederson v. Dumouchel, 72 Wash. 2d 73, 431 P.2d 973 (1967), where the locality rule
for physicians was specifically abolished. The court said, "Parenthetically, we note that the law
of this jurisdiction has never recognized a difference in the professional competency of a lawyer
in a small community from that of the professional competency required of a lawyer in a large
city." Id. at 77,431 P.2d at 977.
9. See B. SHARTEL & M. PLANT, supra note 4.
10. Pederson v. Dumouchel, 72 Wash. 2d 73, 77-78, 431 P.2d 973, 977 (1967), discussed

in text accompanying notes 31-33 infra.
11.
locality"
12.
328, 332

See 18 DEPAuL L. REv. 328, 332 n.13 (1968) for a list of states following the "same
rule.
E.g., Michael v. Roberts, 91 N.H. 499, 23 A.2d 361 (1941). See 18 DEPAUL L. REV.
n. 14 (1968) for a list of states following the "same or similar locality" rule.
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not be testifying against a doctor from his own community.
Nevertheless, the plaintiff is still greatly inconvenienced, initially, by
having to determine what constitutes a similar locality, and then
because there is reason to doubt that many doctors would be willing
to testify even against a foreign locality doctor.13 The movement to the
''same or similar locality" rule cannot be expected to alleviate the
problem of low standard of care in small communities because the
standard in similar localities is probably about the same. Despite its
shortcomings, the "same or similar locality" rule is a slight
improvement over the traditional "same locality" rule.
C. Criticismof the Locality Rule
Although the original reasons used to justify the locality rules
might have been valid 50 to 100 years ago, there is no longer a lack
of training opportunities and means of contact with other parts of the
country. The quality of transportation has improved greatly, and there
have been significant advances in the communications industry. New
techniques and discoveries are available to all doctors within a short
period of time through medical journals, closed circuit television
presentations, special radio networks for doctors, tape recorded digests
of medical literature, and current correspondence courses." Perhaps the
most unique means of providing the rural doctor with the latest
medical developments at a moment's notice was created this year in
Alabama. J5 The Medical College of Alabama in Birmingham created
a consultation service, Medical Information Service via Telephone
(MIST), which provides a 24-hour switchboard through which the
calling doctor can be connected to a staff specialist in the area of
inquiry. The country doctor from the most remote corner of the state
can now receive free advice from highly qualified specialists. In
addition to the advancements in means of communications, the quality
of medical schools has been improved; 6 a national accrediting system
13. W. PRoSsER, supra note 1,at 167& n.45.
14. See Harris, Survey of Medical Communication Sources Available for Continuing
Physician Education, 41 J.MED. EDUC. 737 (1966); Orr, The "Newer" Mediafor Post-Graduate
Education-TheirPromises and Problems,37 J. MED. EDUC. 137 (1962),

15. Tire, Oct. 10, 1969, at 72.
16.

The early medical school curriculum consisted of a course of lectures over a period of

6 months. Sometimes this same course was taken for a second time for a total of 1 year of
schooling. This formal education was supplemented by apprenticeships with doctors who had even
less formal education. Young, Medical Education in the United States, 34 J. MED. EDUC. 802,
803 (1959). In 1910, Abraham Flexner conducted a survey and wrote a report on medical
education. A. FLEXNER, MEDICAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA: A REPORT
TO THE CARNEGIE FOUNDATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING (1910). This work had a
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has led to greater standardization of medical schools throughout the
country.1 7 Furthermore, all licensed physicians, theoretically at least,
meet the minimum standards of knowledge and skill required by their
respective state licensing boards. 5 In view of these developments, it
cannot reasonably be argued that any physician is isolated from centers
of medical advancement.
The locality rules present unreasonable practical difficulties for the
plaintiff, and the reasons for the rule's creation are no longer
significiant. Recognizing these deficiences, some courts have diluted the
locality rules and extended the geographical boundaries under certain
circumstances. Recently a very few courts have even abandoned the
locality rules altogether. A discussion of these steps toward the
abolition of the locality rules follows.
D.

Toward Abandonment of the Locality Rules

1. Expert Witnesses from other Localities.-It is well settled that
in an action for negligence against a doctor the burden of proof is on
the plaintiff to prove by expert testimony the applicable standard of
care. Under locality rules this means the standard in the same or
similar localities,.and an expert from that locality is necessary to
establish the standard. A few states, however, have expanded the
standard by allowing the testimony of expert witnesses who are not
from the same or similar locality. In Sinz v. Owens 9 the California
Supreme Court permitted the plaintiff's expert witness, who was from
a different locality, to testify as to the applicable standard of care. The
court indicated that the essential factor qualifying an expert is his
knowledge of similar conditions; his geographical proximity to the
place of the alleged negligence is just one factor in determining whether
he qualifies." The Georgia Court of Appeals extended this policy in
terrific effect on medical education, and radical changes were made to improve it. See generally
Medical Educationin the UnitedStates, 210 J.A.M.A. 1455 (1969).
17. Accreditation of medical schools in the United States began in 1906 under the AMA
Council on Medical Education. Since 1942, accreditation has been controlled by the AMA's
Liaison Committee on Medical Education and the Association of American Medical Colleges. In

the academic year 1968-69 there were 99 American medical schools of which 85 were fully
accredited 4-year schools granting the MD degree; 6 were accredited 2-year schools of basic
medical sciences; and 8 were under development. Medical Education in the United States, supra
note 16, at 1460. These figures should be compared with those compiled in 1907 when there were
160 medical schools of which only 82 were graded acceptable. Young, supra note 16, at 803.
18. See Ruhe, Medical LicensureStatisticsfor 1967, 204 J.A.M.A. 1067 (1968).
19. 33 Cal. 2d 749,205 P.2d 3 (1949).
20. Id. at 756-57, 205 P.2d at 7. In this case the plaintiff's expert witness came from a
smaller town which was within the trade territory of a larger town common to the defendant's
locale.
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Murphy v. Little,21 where the standard for treatment of fractures was

held to be general and not local by pointing out the invalidity of the
reasoning which underlies requiring local experts.2 Thus, according to

these and other cases,2 the fact that the expert witness does not practice
in the same or a similar locality is no longer the significant factor in

deciding whether or not he will be permitted to testify. He must show
only knowledge of the standard of care that is applicable to the locality
and medical problem involved.

It would be desirable if all courts would realize that their only
concern should be with the witness's knowledge of the prevailing
standard of care either in the defendant doctor's community, as in the
Sinz case, or in the general practice of medicine, as in the Murphy case.

There are still a large number of courts that either have not considered
the question of the outside expert or have simply refused to weaken the

locality rules in any way. They have categorically rejected the
testimony of any doctor who comes from a different community. 2
There are two situations where the plaintiff's problem of
establishing the standard of care by experts has been solved. In some
areas the medical and bar associations have taken steps to aid
21. 112Ga. App. 517, 145S.E.2d760(1965).
22. Id. at 522, 145 S.E.2d at 764. It should be noted that Georgia has a statute, GA. CODS
ANN. § 84-924 (1955), that prescribes a general standard rather than a local one to medical
practitioners. This particular case involved the treatment of a fracture which is considered by
some courts to be an elementary medical problem and, therefore, subject to a more general
standard of care. Murphy v. Little is discussed in text accompanying notes 41-43 infra.
Wisconsin has a statute that permits any person who qualifies as a medical expert to testify
on medical subjects. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 147.14(2)(b) (1957). In Alabama the common law rule
of evidence permits the use of medical textbooks and treatises as a substitute for expert testimony.
Watkins v. Potts, 219 Ala. 427, 122 So. 416 (1929). Massachusetts and Nevada have statutes to
this effect. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 233, § 79C (Supp. 1968); NEv. REv. STAT. § 51.040 (1967).
23. In Riley v. Layton, 329 F.2d 53 (10th Cir. 1964), the treatment was for a broken arm
and a physician from San Francisco qualified to testify as to the standard of care in a small Utah
town. In Montgomery v. Stary, 84 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1955), the alleged negligent conduct was that
the defendants so severely scalded and burned an infant's hand that the ingers and thumb had
to be amputated. Three Chicago doctors were permitted to testify over the objections by the
defendants that they were not familiar with the standard in the same or similar localities. In Teig
v. St. John's Hosp., 63 Wash. 2d 369, 387 P.2d 527 (1963), another broken bone case, the
plaintiff's expert from Portland qualified to testify as to the standard of care in a town 50 miles
away. In Hundley v. Martinez, 151 W. Va. 977, 158 S.E.2d 159 (1967), a case involving a
cataract operation by the specialist defendant,'an outside expert was allowed. It should be noted
that the fact situations in the above cited cases subject them to broader standards because they
deal with elementary medical problems, discussed in text accompanying notes 41-46 infra, and
specialists, discussed in text accompanying notes 47-55 infra. Cf.text accompanying note 24 Infra.
24. Lockhart v. Maclean, 77 Nev. 210, 361 P.2d 670 (1961). A comment on this case
appears in 14 STAN. L. REv. 884 (1962). See also Ramsland v. Shaw, 341 Mass. 56, 166 N.E.2d
894 (1960); Versteeg v. Mowery, 72 Wash. 2d 754, 435 P.2d 540 (1967).
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deserving plaintiffs who are unable to obtain expert witnesses. Under
such circumstances a panel of qualified and impartial experts examine
the plaintiff's allegations and agree to testify for him if a finding of
negligence is made. 2 There are other situations where the jury is
allowed to infer negligence without the aid of an expert.2 6 This occurs
when the doctor's conduct can be evaluated by the jury because it is
thought to be within the common knowledge of laymen.
Our system of compensation for injuries caused by negligence is
undermined by doctors who refuse to testify against each other. If an
expert is qualified and demonstrates knowledge of the applicable
standard, he should not be barred from testifying simply because he
happens to live in another community.
2. Accessibility of Resources.-Another approach utilized to
dilute the locality rules has been to extend the geographical boundaries
to include those centers that are readily accessible for appropriate
treatment of the patient. This expanded rule has been articulated in
27
terms of a "medical neighborhood" or the "medical locality rule. 1
The rationale behind extending the geographical boundaries was
expressed in 1940 by the Supreme Court of North Dakota in Tvedt v.
Haugen,28 a case involving the negligent treatment of a complicated
bone fracture by a small-town practitioner whose defense was that he
did not have an adequate X-ray machine. The court rejected this
defense and pointed out that the defendant was familiar with and had
2
access to more expert advice and facilities located in nearby towns. 1
One year later on similar facts in Flock v. J.C. Palumbo Fruit Co., 3
the Supreme Court of Idaho followed and quoted the language of
Tvedt.
25.

See SPECIAL

COMMITTEE OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK,

IMPARTIAL MEDICAL TESTIMONY (1956).

26. Id. For example, the medical practioner might have cut off the wrong leg, pulled the
wrong tooth, or burned an arm while operating on a toe. See Scardina v. Colletti, 63 Ill. App.
2d 481, 211 N.E.2d 762 (1965), where the court said: "The so called 'common knowledge' and

'gross negligence' exceptions to the requirement of expert testimony are applicable if the

negligence of the physician is so grossly apparent or the treatment is such a common occurrence

that a layman would have no difficulty in appraising it." Id. at 488, 211 N.E.2d at 766. See also
F. HARPER & F. JAMES, TORTS § 17.1, at 968 (1956); Morris, Custom and Negligence, 42
COLUM. L. REv. 1147, 1165 (1942); Note, Malpracticeand Medical Testimony, 77 HARV. L. REv.
333 (1963); Comment, Medical Malpractice-ExpertTestimony, 60 Nw. U.L. Rav. 834 (1966).
27. E.g., Geraty v. Kaufman, 115 Conn. 563, 162 A. 33 (1932). The court held that the
medical neighborhood was wide enough to include both New London and New Haven.
28. 70 N.D. 338, 294 N.W. 183 (1940).

29.

Id. at 349, 294 N.W. at 188.

30. 63 Idaho 220, 238, 118 P.2d 707, 714-15 (1941); accord, Hodgson v. Bigelow, 335 Pa.
497, 7 A.2d 338 (1939).
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In the recent case of Pederson v. Dumouchel,31 the Supreme Court
of Washington abolished the locality rule. The court, holding that
instructing the jury that the medical standard of care is based on the
practice of other physicians in the same or similar locality was
reversible error, declared: "The 'locality rule' has no present-day
vitality except that it may be considered as one of the elements to
determine the degree of care and skill which is to be expected of the
average practitioner .... "2 Thus the Washington court joined the
ranks of those that have embraced the medical neighborhood doctrine
by stating that the standard of care "is that established in an area
coextensive with the medical and professional means available in those
centers that are readily accessible for appropriate treatment of the
patient."' '
The effect of these decisions is that some courts will not be bound
by artificial geographical boundaries but will apply the standard of
care of the superior medical locality proven by the plaintiff to be
readily accessible. The adoption of this standard entails, of course, the
rejection of the antiquated locality rules, a move that is not surprising
in light of modern conditions and the general criticism of the locality
rules. 34 There is, then, an apparent trend to find a suitable substitute
for the locality rules that have dominated, and still dominate, the
medical negligence scene. Although some cases and commentators
indicate that we are headed for a minimum national standard, 35 it has
been suggested that the medical locality rule provides the proper
standard of care. 3 The basis for such a view is that the medical locality
rule emphasizes access to areas where superior medical skill and
knowledge exist and those physicians having access to them should be
held to a higher standard of care. By the same token, it does not
impose an unreasonable standard upon the most isolated doctor.37
As was pointed out by the Pederson court, locality differences in
standards of care have never been applied to the legal profession 38 or
31. 72 Wash. 2d 73, 431 P.2d 973 (1967). This case is noted in 44 WASH. L. REv. 50
(1969) and 46 N.C.L. REv. 680 (1968).
32. Pederson v. Dumouchel, 72 Wash. 2d 73, 79,431 P.2d 973, 978 (1967).

33. Id. The plaintiff's injury was caused by the negligence of a general practitioner in a
town 110 miles from Seattle where the plaintiff was ultimately taken.
34. See, e.g., Comment, Medical Malpractice-Expert Testimony, 60 Nw. U.L. REv. 834,
837-39 (1966); 14 STAN. L. REv. 884 (1962).
35. This proposition is discussed in text accompanying notes 40-60 infra.
36. 44 WASH. L. REv. 505, 510 (1969).
37. Nevertheless, a physician practicing in a locality where the standard is low would be

knowledgeable enough to advise his patients that better medical care is available elsewhere. I D.
LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, supra note 3,
8.07, at 212.
38. Pederson v. Dumouchel, 72 Wash. 2d 73,431 P.2d 973 (1967); see note 8 supra.
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other professions. The conduct of other members of the profession is
looked to only to show customary practice-one factor to be

considered by the jury, but not a conclusive standard. 9 The medical
profession, however, even under the medical neighborhood rule, still
has some of the protection of a conclusive standard based on a specific

locality.
3. Minimum NationalStandard.-As mentioned above, there is
some evidence that medical standards are approaching national
uniformity. 0 When a court recognizes the disadvantages of the

traditional locality rules, the question arises as to what should replace
them. The medical locality rule has been suggested and discussed.
However, a minimum national standard is a competing alternative that

has been applied in special situations.
(a)

Basic medical problem.-A few courts seem to be willing to

hold a physician to a national standard of care for common types of
medical operations. For example, in Murphy v. Little4 the plaintiff, an

eleven-year-old boy, suffered a fractured forearm. The defendant placed
the arm in a plaster cast, but two days later swelling and a dusky color
were noticed in the boy's hand. By the time the defendant removed the

cast four days after it was applied, the plaintiff had suffered from
Volkmann's ischemic contracture, a failure of circulation in the arm
resulting in tissue necrosis, loss of use, and deformity. The court held
that at least in respect of treatment of fractures the standard is general
rather than local.42 It should be noted that the court was aided by a
Georgia statute4 3 that sets the standard as the degree of care and skill

which is ordinarily employed by the profession generally and not such
as is ordinarily employed by the profession in the community.
In addition to fractures, another area of basic medical practice has

been the use of medical X-ray. Since X-ray procedures are relatively
39. The customary practice doctrine is discussed in text accompanying notes 63-95 infra.
40. See I D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, supra note 3,
8.07, at 211.
41. 112 Ga. App. 517, 145 S.E.2d 760 (1965). This case was discussed in connection with
expert witnesses; see text accompanying notes 21-22 supra. See also cases involving elementary
medical problems cited in note 23 supra.
42. "There are doubtless areas of medicine where knowledge of proper treatment is limited
geographically by prevalence of the disease or by reason of special facilities for study, but the
human race has suffered from broken bones for as long as it has been in existence. Hippocrates
wrote a treatise 'On Fractures' in the fourth century B.C. in which he observed that a 'blackenihg
of the swelling' of the injured limb might result, among other causes, from the tightness of the
bandage." Murphy v. Little, 112 Ga. App. 517, 522-23, 145 S.E.2d 760, 764 (1965). See also
Lewis v. Johnson, 12 Cal. 2d 558, 86 P.2d 99 (1939), where it was said: "Common knowledge,
as well as the testimony of the doctors on both sides, tells us that the method used in treating
this particular kind of fracture was one in use throughout the world." Id. at 561, 86 P.2d at 101.
43. GA. CODE ANN. § 84-924 (1955).
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standard throughout the country, it is reasonable to apply a national
standard. In Christian v. Jeter," the defendant physician was charged
with negligence for failing to make follow-up X-rays that would have
shown an improper setting of a dislocated elbow. The plaintiff's expert
testified that post-reduction X-rays to determine proper alignment are
in common use, and any general practitioner should be qualified to
make them. The court remanded the case to the jury for a
determination of negligence based-on this testimony. In McElroy v.
Frost,45 in which an X-ray was used for therapy, the court stated: "It
is a matter of common understanding that a proper method of treating
human ailments by X-ray would not vary from place to place or state
to state. What is the best practice in one place likewise would be the
best in another."" If, then, certain practices and procedures are basic
to all physicians, there is no reason not to apply a national standard.
(b) Specialists.-It is easier for courts to apply a national
standard to specialists, since the practice of medicine by certified
specialists within each of the American Medical Association's
recognized specialties is similar throughout the country.47 Under these
circumstances, distinctions based on locality would be senseless.
In Brune v. Belinkoff,4s where the locality rule was abolished, and
in other cases where the courts have come close to abolition," the
defendants were specialists. The Brune case was an action in negligence
against an anesthesiology specialist who allegedly administered an
excessive dosage of a spinal anesthetic. The defense was that in New
Bedford, the community in which the defendant practiced, the dosage
administered was customary. The Supreme Court of Massachusetts
reversed the lower court's judgment for the defendant and specifically
abandoned the locality rule that was established in Massachusetts in
1880 when Small v. Howard0 was decided.
It is interesting to note that the facts in this case-New Bedford
44. 445 S.W.2d 51 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969); see Giles v. Tyson, 13 S.W.2d 452 (rex, Civ.
App. 1929).
45. 268 P.2d 273 (Okla. 1954).

46. Id. at 279-80.
47. See the results of the medical specialist survey conducted by the board of editors of the
Stanford Law Review. 14 STAN. L. REv. 884, 887-89 (1962).
48. 354 Mass. 102, 235 N.E.2d 793 (1968), noted in 82 HARv. L. REv. 1781 (1969); 34
Mo. L. REv. 297 (1969); 18 DEPAUL L. REv. 328 (1968).
49. The other case that specifically abolished the locality rule is Pederson v. Dutnouchel,

which was discussed in connection with the medical neighborhood standard of care in the text
accompanying notes 31-33 supra. Decisions hinting at abolition are mentioned later in this
section.
50. 128 Mass. 131, 35 Am. R. 363 (1880); see note 7supra.
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being 50 miles from Boston-make it a suitable candidate for
application of the medical neighborhood rule which had already been
articulated by several courts.51 The Brune court, however, chose to go
a step further and apply minimum national standards to specialists.
The standard allows the jury to consider medical resources available,
the locality of the defendant's practice, and advances of the profession.
Brune has removed the locality test in Massachusetts and stands as
another landmark in the quest for higher medical standards.
New Jersey appears to have abandoned the locality rules, at least
with regard to specialists. Without discussing the locality rules, two
New Jersey courts have established the standard as that degree of care,
knowledge, and skill ordinarily possessed and exercised in similar
situations by the average member of the profession practicing in his
field.5 2 In West Virginia, in Hundley v. Martinez, 3 the court articulated
its locality rule rather than a national standard; however, the defendant
opthalmology specialist was held to a standard nationwide procedure
5
for cataract operations. 1
There is certainly good reason for having nationwide medical
standards in cases involving defendants who are medical specialists.
One survey, conducted to determine standard nationwide practice
among specialists, indicated that the practice of medicine by certified
specialists within most medical specialties is similar throughout the
country." This conclusion was based on the existence of standardized
requirements for certification, subscriptions to medical specialty
journals, medical specialty societies, and statements from American
speciality boards. If a national standard is to be established, it is
reasonable that the specialists lead the way.
(c) Generalpractitioners.-Thepreceding sections have discussed
cases in which a few courts have indicated a willingness to adopt a
51.
52.

See notes 25-35 supra and accompanying text.
Fernandez v. Baruch, 96 N.J. Super. 125, 232 A.2d 661 (1967) (psychiatrist); Schueler

v. Strelinger, 43 N.J. 330, 204 A.2d 577 (1964) (surgeon); see McGulpin v. Bessmer, 241 Iowa
1119, 43 N.W.2d 121 (1950); Josselyn v. Dearborn, 143 Me. 328, 62 A.2d 174 (1948). Neither
case abolished the locality rules but came close by saying that locality was merely one
circumstance to be considered.
53. 151 W.Va. 977, 158 S.E.2d 159 (1967). The court's concern in this case was the
qualification of an expert witness who testified to knowledge of the uniform standard procedure

throughout the county for performing cataract operations.
54. See also Duling v. Bluefield Sanitarium, Inc., 149 W.Va. 567, 142 S.E.2d 754 (1965)
where the same court held that standards in respect of nurses responsible for the care of patients

in hospitals are general, rather than local, in scope.
55. 14 STAN. L. REV. 884, 887-89 (1962); see
DIRECTORY OF MEDICAL SPECIALISTS

19-22 (1968).
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uniform national standard when an elementary medical procedure is
negligently performed or when the defendant is a specialist. The reasons
for applying a nationwide standard in such cases are stronger than in
the case where a small-town general practitioner performs a relatively
difficult operation. Nevertheless, two courts have shown that they are
ready for a minimum national standard for general practitioners. Both
of these courts have specifically abolished the locality rules in their
states.
In Brune v. BelinkofJf6 the defendant was an anesthesiology
specialist, but the court articulated the standard of care in terms of the
general practitioner. The court stated: "The proper standard is
whether the physician, if a general practitioner, has exercised the degree
of care and skill of the average qualified practitioner, taking into
account the advances of the profession." 57 This language, dictum as to
general practitioners, leaves no doubt that the Massachusetts Supreme
Court is ready to hold general practitioners to a national standard.
In Douglas v. Bussabarger,s the plaintiff was partially paralyzed
as the result of a spinal anesthetic administered by the defendant
general practitioner who performed an operation to repair a stomach
ulcer. The court held as erroneous an instruction that led the jury to
believe that less stringent standards of medical practice should be
applied for general practitioners in one community than those allowed
for physicians in more populous areas.59
It has often been pointed out that no single group occupies a more
favorable position at law than members of the medical profession.G' It
is refreshing to note that in the Douglas opinion, the court talked more
about giving relief to the patient, than protecting the doctor. As the
court indicated, it would be absurd for a potential patient to have to
56. This case is discussed thoroughly in text accompanying notes 47-51 supra.
57.
58.
59.

235 N.E.2d 793, 798 (Mass. 1968).
73 Wash.2d 476, 438 P.2d 829 (1968).
"'Rural and small-town doctors could not enjoy advantages not given by the law to any

other class of rural and small-town tort defendants. When patients considering operations
approach doctors in Raymond (Wash.), the doctors do not admit that they can be a little more
careless and act with less responsibility than can doctors in Olympia, who can be a little more negligent than doctors in Tacoma, who can be a little more negligent than doctors in Seattle, who can
be considerably more negligent than the doctors in New York City. Certainly, if doctors should
freely indicate such discrepancies in medical practice, it would not be surprising that there would
be a decrease in the number of operations in Tacoma and Olympia-and a greater decrease still
in the Raymond area." Id. at 490, 438 P.2d at 838.
60. See Steincipher, Survey of Medical Professional Liability in Washington, 39 WAstH. L.
REv. 704, 710 (1964).
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consider the size of the town and the character of the medical practice
before agreeing to a particular operation or treatment.
Neither of these courts specifically talks about a minimum
national standard. Perhaps the use of such terminology is too radical
even for these two modern courts. Instead, they make it clear that they
are applying a general standard, but most of their discussion is a
criticism of the existing locality rules.
E. Locality Rule Summary
The courts that are deemphasizing or abolishing the locality rules
are moving away from a reliance upon geographic location and toward
an emphasis on the doctor's opportunities for acquiring information
concerning current medical practice and procedure."' Whether
.verbalized as a national standard or not, the effect is to move toward
a more standardized practice throughout the country. The doctors will
continue to set by customary practice the standard by which they are
to be judged, but any increase in geographical boundaries will improve
the overall level of practice. One practical solution is to do away with
the same or similar locality jury instruction but permit the jury to
consider the doctor's opportunity for acquiring knowledge of current
medical practice and procedure as one factor."
III.

CUSTOMARY PRACTICE

A.

Background

After the applicable locality rule has been determined, it is
necessary to analyze the medical malpractice case in terms of the
customary practice element of the standard of care. It is at this stage
that the defendant doctor's conduct is compared with that of the fellow
members of his profession. The applicable locality rules have a direct
bearing on the customary practice element since a larger geographical
reference area provides a broader custom.
In the ordinary tort case not involving medical malpractice,
evidence of customary performance or procedure among an
occupational group is generally admissible as one factor-not a
conclusive one-in determining the proper standard of conduct by
61. McCoid, supra note 1, at 575. But see, e.g., Fiske v. Soland, 8 Ariz. App. 585, 448
P.2d 429 (1969), for the traditional application of the old same locality rule by a modern court.
62. See W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 166-67. Consideration of locality as one circumstance
was applied by the court in Brune v. Belinkoff, 235 N.E.2d 793, 798 (Mass. 1968).
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which to judge the defendant's actions. 3 However, in medical
negligence cases custom within the profession is, almost exclusively, the
standard of care." Dean Prosser has said: "[T]he standard of conduct
becomes one of 'good medical practice,' which is to say, what is
customary and usual in the profession.'5 Expert medical testimony
would, of course, be used to establish what is "good medical practice."
This gives the medical profession a privilege, unavailable to other
groups, of setting their own legal standards of conduct, merely by
engaging in certain practices."
The opposing argument is that "customary practice" is not
necessarily the same as "good medical practice," and, if compliance
with custom is to establish non-liability, it must be proved that the
customary practice is in fact reasonable. 7 Historically, however, the
courts have refused to measure the doctor's conduct by the reasonable
man standard applied to other groups. This is fortunate for the doctor
since in the reasonable man concept the law requires more than average
conduct; it requires average prudent conduct.6 8 Since the standard for
physicians is average or minimum acceptable conduct, application of
the customary practice test rather than the more general reasonable
man test affords the medical practitioner somewhat more protection.69
The physician is further protected by permitting him to pursue a course
followed by a respectable minority of the profession. 0 Thus if a
physician can show by expert testimony that he followed a recognized
school of thought, he is protected. The net result is that physicans
establish their own standard, and only when there is disagreement
among the experts as to whether the conduct complied with a
recognized school of thought will the jury be allowed to select the
standard."
63. See McCoid, supra note 1,at 605-06. See also 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, TORTS § 17.3,
at 977 (1956).
64. Id. See also 1 D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, supra note 3,
8.04, at 200.
65. W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 167-68.
66. Id. at 168. See generally Morris, Custom and Negligence, 42 COLUM. L. Rsv. 1147
(1942).
67. See McCoid, supra note 1, at 606.
68. See Curran, Professional Negligence-Some General Comments, 12 VAND. L. REV.
535, 538 (1959).
69. See McCoid, supra note 1, at 607 n. 266.
70. See I D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 204.
71. See Curran, supra note 68, at 538-39.
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B.

Reasonsfor and against the Customary PracticeTest

Sbveral explanations have been offered for reliance on the custom
test.72 First, it was thought that since physicians held themselves out
to the public as having particular knowledge and skill, the custom test
was appropriate. Members of other professions, however, hold
themselves out and are not judged conclusively by the custom test.
Another explanation is the lack of capacity of lay triers of fact to
evaluate a physician's conduct against a general reasonable man
standard. But laymen have been permitted to judge medical conduct
without the aid of expert testimony in X-ray and sponge cases. 73 Also,
expert testimony could be utilized to enlighten these laymen without
allowing conformity to their testimony to become a conclusive defense.
Again, members of other professions are privy to difficult concepts and
uncommon knowledge that must be evaluated by the lay jury. A third
explanation has been that the courts have chosen to bestow a preferred
status upon members of the medical profession. This stems from the
feeling that doctors should be free to practice medicine without the fear
of being judged later by an outsider with after-the-fact knowledge of
unfortunate results. Raising the standard to which the physician would
be held above the customary practice would result in more malpractice
recoveries, each one of which has the effect of branding the doctor as
incompetent. Although there might have been only one deviation from
the standard, the individual doctor is ruined and public confidence in
the medical profession is undermined. It is also argued that it is
administratively burdensome if a custom is adjudged negligent and the
entire profession must alter its procedures or take the chance that the
deciding court was wrong. Another argument is simply that no other
74
standard is practical.
It has been suggested that in protecting the doctor, the injured
patient has been forgotten; there is no comfort in failing to recover
because the defendant doctor follows a negligent custom. Raising the
standard of care would mean more recoveries, and the doctors could
meet this new financial obligation by spreading the risk among all
patients. 75 If the customary practice test were not conclusive, a greater
measure of care would result as doctors would strive to keep abreast
72. See W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 168; McCoid, supra note 1, at 607-08.
73. See W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 168 & n.52; McCoid, supra note 1, at 608, 610-14,

575-76.
74. See generally MeCoid, supra note 1, at 609; Morris, Custom and Negligence, 42
COLtJM. L. REV. 1147, 1163-67 (1942).
75. McCoid, supra note 1, at 609.
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of new developments.76 Finally, it has been suggested that doctors
should testify on medical theory since that is77 their area of expertise;
they are not experts on medical reasonableness.
C. Exceptions to Customary PracticeApplication
Although the medical custom standard is firmly entrenched in
legal practice and procedure, that standard may not be applied in all
cases. Some courts have held that a defendant doctor cannot escape
liability by establishing customary practice wvhere the physician acts in
such an obviously careless manner while performing a common sense
task that any layman could determine whether the doctor has in fact
been negligent.7 For example, this has been held where an arm was
bandaged too tightly79 or where the patient was badly burned by a hot
water bottle."
An even more common exception to the customary practice rule
is illustrated by cases involving sponges (gauze pads) and other foreign
objects left in incisions by doctors."' The generally accepted methods
used to prevent sponges from being left in the body include strings
attached to the sponge and protruding from the incision, sponge
counts, and sponges with radioactive threads that can be detected by
X-rays. Evidence of compliance with these procedures would probably
indicate a following of customary practice as well as due care since
there is not much more one can do to insure that the sponges are out.
However, when it is discovered that a sponge did remain in the body
there is a strong implication of negligence because the chances of
leaving a sponge after following the approved techniques are slim.
76.

In Fernandi v. Strully, 35 N.J. 434, 173 A.2d 277 (1961) the court said: "If, as is to

be hoped, the resulting jeopardy to defendants produces a greater measure of care in connection

with surgical operations, so much the better." Id. at 451, 173 A.2d at 286. Professor Morris has
said: "Doctors as a class may be more likely to exert their best efforts than drovers, railroads,
and merchants; but they are human and subject to the temptations of laziness and unthinking
acceptance of traditions." Morris, Custom and Negligence, 42 COLUM. L. REv. 1147, 1164

(1942).
77. Morris, supra note 76.
78. Id. at 1165.
79. Gruginski v. Lane, 177 Wash. 121, 30 P.2d 970 (1934).
80. Duke Sanitarium v. Hearn, 159 Okla. 1, 13 P.2d 183 (1932); see Scardina v. Colletti,
63 II1. App. 2d 481, 211 N.E.2d 762 (1965), where the court said: "The so called 'common
knowledge' and 'gross negligence' exceptions to the requirement of expert testimony are applicable
if the negligence of the physician is so grossly apparent or the treatment is such a common
occurrence that a laymen would have no difficulty in appraising it." Id. at 488, 211 N.E.2d at
766.
81. See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 1,at 168; McCoid, supra note 1,at 610-14;
Morris, supra note 76, at 1166-67.
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Since reasonable conduct does not require favorable results every time,
it is quite possible that the doctor did act reasonably even though a
sponge was left. Nevertheless, in the usual case, the defendant presents
evidence of compliance with the approved technique which is weighed
against evidence that the sponge was left in the body. Because of the
strong implication of negligence the jury usually concludes that the
defendant doctor's evidence was either mistaken or false.
The other general exception to the customary practice rule is seen
in cases where a doctor fails to use an X-ray for diagnosis of certain
ailments or for a post-operative examination to insure that the desired
results were obtained.12 The most common areas where this problem
arises are fractures, dislocations, and suspected foreign matter in the
body. 13 Proof that he followed customary practice in these cases where
an X-ray was not used has not conclusively freed the doctor from
liability.
D. Indicationsof Change
There are a few indications that practicing medicine according to
the established custom will not necessarily create immunity from tort
liability. Forgetting for a moment the policy considerations discussed
above, it does not seem unreasonable to hold a physician liable for
following a customary practice that is in fact negligent. To arrive at
such a holding, it should be shown that the customary practice fails to
meet a test of reasonable care and diligence required of the medical
profession. There are several cases which illustrate that some courts are
beginning to move in this direction, or at least are becoming
dissatisfied with the traditional customary practice rule.
In Lundahl v. Rockford Memorial Hospital Ass'n81 the plaintiff
had shown symptoms of constipation, but the doctor gave him an
indigestible substance to drink before X-rays were to be taken.
Subsequently, serious damage resulted from the plaintiff's efforts to
relieve himself. Although the court found no negligence on the part of
the doctor, it did recognize that following the customary practice is not
a sure defense. The court said: "the fact that the treatment given was
'usual' or 'customary' would not, of itself, preclude the possibility of
either negligence or want of skill. It is entirely possible . . . that what
82. See cases cited in text accompanying notes 16-20supra.
83. See McCoid, supra note 1,at 575-76.
84. 93 Il1. App. 2d 461, 235 N.E.2d 671 (1968). Although an X-ray is involved in the fact
situation, the alleged negligence was not the defendant's failure to use an X-ray, which is a typical

customary practice exception.
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is the usual or customary procedure might itself be negligent.",,5 In
Toth v. Community Hospital," the doctor ordered a reduction in
oxygen being given to a baby; the order was not carried out; the baby
became blind; and the doctor was sued for negligence on the ground
that he failed to insure that his orders were followed. The court held
that a jury could find negligence even where a customary practice was
followed. 7 The importance of these decisions is that the couits show a
willingness to require more of the doctor than mere compliance with
customary practices.
In Favalora v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co."8 the plaintiff became
dizzy during an X-ray session, fainted, and fell to the floor. If the
radiologist had seen the plaintiff's medical history, he would have
known that she had dizzy spells-one of the reasons for the
examination -and could have prevented the injuries. Although it was
customary not to furnish medical histories to radiologists prior to
taking X-rays, the court held the radiologist liable. The court indicated
that it is unreasonable and arbitrary to grant immunity, when there is
a failure to take a known precaution, just because others in the
profession fail to exercise due care.". Here then is a case where the
doctor followed a customary practice but was held liable because
reasonable care and diligence dictated that this practice was negligent.
There is a good possibility that we shall see more of this in the near
future.
What part should customary practice play where a court does not
consider it controlling on the question of negligence? It is submitted
that the proper approach was employed in Morgan v. Sheppard," where
the court said that evidence of conformity can be considered, along
with all other circumstances, without being conclusive.12 Use of
customary medical practice as one of the circumstances to be
85. Id. at 465, 235 N.E.2d at 674. This decision was based on Darling v. Charleston
Community Memorial Hosp., 33 Ill. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965).
86. 22 N.Y.2d 255, 239 N.E.2d 368, 292 N.Y.S.2d 440 (1968).
87. Id. at 263, 239 N.E.2d at 373,22 N.Y.S.2d at 447.
88. 144 So. 2d 544 (La. App. 1962). Here again X-ray appears in the facts, but the alleged
negligence had to do with not sending the patient's medical history with the patient rather than
a failure to make an X-ray.
89. Id. at 551-52.
90. See George v. Travelers Ins. Co., 215 F. Supp. 340 (E.D. La. 1963), which followed
the Favaloracase; cf. Naccarato v. Grob, 12 Mich. App. 130, 162 N.W.2d 305 (1968).
91. 91 Ohio L. Abs. 579, 188 N.E.2d 808 (1963). In this case the defendant was in charge
of the patient after a partial gastrectomy but did not visit the patient until twelve hours after
receiving notice that the patient was in shock.
92. Id. at593, 188 N.E.2d816-17.
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considered is the same function business custom serves when a layman
3
is on trial for negligence.
E. Customary PracticeSummary
Some writers have expressed general satisfaction with the
conventional standard based on customary practice,94 and some of the
arguments on both sides of the controversy have been mentioned above.
There are, however, other considerations. The customary practice rule
is closely tied to the locality rule. Where both rules are applied, the
defendant doctor can escape liability by showing that his conduct
conformed to the customary practice of other practitioners in the
applicable locality. As the courts expand the geographical boundaries
in applying the locality rule to the doctor, the customary practice rule,
in its present form, will not afford doctors the protection it does now.
Enlarging the geographical area will generally upgrade the customary
practice on which the doctor must model his practice. Therefore, by
abolishing or expanding the locality rules the courts necessarily create
a higher customary practice standard.
In the section on the locality rules it was pointed out that the
policy reason for abolishing the locality rule is that a doctor should not
be granted relief from liability merely because the doctors practicing
in his locality set a low standard. By analogy, if doctors in general
establish a standard of customary practice that is negligent, the doctor
who follows it should not automatically escape liability. Assuming that
the geographical boundaries at the applicable locality are broadened,
if the custom in that larger area is still negligent, the doctor should still
be held accountable. If customary practice is made to be one factor to
be considered rather than the conclusive consideration, it is likely that
there will be more recoveries by injured patients .15
IV.

MISTAKE OF JUDGMENT

Although there is room for subjective elements to enter into the
determination of malpractice, the standard is intended to be objective. 6
93.
94.
95.

See generally Morris, supra note 76, at 1147.
1 D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, supra note 3; McCoid, supra note 1.
It is certain that the doctors will not foot the bill. Insurance will continue to be the

immediate paying agent. See B. SHARTEL

&

M.

PLANT,

supra note 4, § 3-32, at 163. It has been

suggested that in addition to the doctors' malpractice insurance we may soon see some type of

government insurance plan to cover personal injuries caused by professional negligence. Curran,
supra note 68, at 546.

96.

Curran, supra note 68, at 538; 1 D.

LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS,

supra note 3.
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There is, however, an almost totally subjective test-honest mistake of
judgment-that is often applied to a physician's conduct which protects
him from liability.
A.

Application of Mistake of Judgment

Simply stated, a physician is not liable for an honest mistake of
judgment, provided he brings to his patient the requisite degree of skill
and care.17 The law requires the doctor to base his decisions on skill
and careful study of the case, but there is no liability for conduct
dictated by a bona fide exercise of judgment." This is especially true
when the proper course is open to reasonable doubt, as when different
schools of thought advocate different procedures. 9
An actual fact situation can be utilized at this point to illustrate
some of the general principles surrounding mistake of judgment. In
Loudon v. Scott'°0 the patient died from the shock of the anesthetic
given in conjunction with an operation. There was no evidence
indicating that the defendant doctor did not possess the requisite skill
and learning. The evidence did show that he knew the patient's medical
history, physical characteristics, drinking habits, and the extent of the
present injury. With this background the doctor determined that the
patient could withstand the shock of the anesthetic. The court held that
the doctor exercised a bona fide judgment for which he could not be
liable.
The reason for allowing the doctor to avoid liability for a mistake
of judgment is that the practice of medicine necessarily involves the
exercise of individual judgment. 01 All medical diagnosis and treatment
contains some degree of educated speculation, and it is argued that the
law should make allowances for reasonable differences of opinion.
Otherwise, the doctor would be deterred from using his skill and
judgment to provide the patient with good medical care. The fear seems
to be that the doctor's conduct will be judged in light of subsequent
developments rather than in light of the conditions existing at the time
of the decision. These are reasonable concerns not only for doctors but
for other professionals. It appears that lawyers, too, are excused from
97.

E.g., Belk v. Schweizer, 268 N.C. 50, 56, 149 S.E.2d 565, 570 (1966).

98. See, J.

RICHARDSON, DOCTORS, LAWYERS, AND THE COURTS, §

i.Ile, at 24 (1965);

B. SHARTEL & M. PLANT, supra note 4, § 3-08, at 119.
99. See W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 165.
100. 58 Mont. .45, 194 P. 488 (1920).
101. See 1 D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 204-05; J. RICHARDSON, supra
note 98.
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liability when there is a mistake of judgment.102 It is submitted that the
mistake of judgment concept is useful when applied correctly.
Nevertheless, mistake of judgment is sometimes used too loosely
to explain away a bad result.10 3 As with the locality and customary
practice rules, the courts must insure that the reasons for the
application of the mistake of judgment doctrine are present whenever
it is used.
B.

Negligenceor Errorof Judgment

Medical judgment can be exercised at various stages of the
physician-patient relationship. For classification purposes most cases
involve an alleged error in diagnosis or an error in method of
treatment. It is pretty safe to say that there will be no liability for an
honest mistake of judgment in either case, but the facts in several cases
indicate that perhaps there was negligence rather than an honest
mistake of judgment.
1. Diagnosis.-An honest mistake of judgment in diagnosing a
medical problem should be a valid defense,"0 4 but only if one of the
following factors is present: (1) there is reasonable doubt as to the
nature of the physical conditions involved; (2) there is a split of
recognized medical authority as to the diagnostic procedure, one of
which is followed; or (3) the diagnosis is made after a conscientious
effort by the physician to inform himself of the symptoms and physical
state of the patient." 5 The physician's conduct in each case must be
carefully examined to determine whether there was in fact a bona fide
mistake of judgment or some degree of negligence.
In Oftedal v. Calaway' 6 a malpractice action was brought against
a doctor who diagnosed the patient's problem as ptomaine poisoning
instead of appendicitis. Subsequently the patient died. The record
showed that the doctor examined the patient and questioned him
concerning his activities during the past few days. After being told that
102. See, e.g., Hodges v. Carter, 239 N.C. 517, 80 S.E.2d 144 (1954). See generally Wade,
The Attorney's Liability ForNegligence, 12 VAND.L. REv.755, 764-65 (1959).
103. "But often the 'mistake of judgment' notion . . . servei chiefly to deflect attention
from the need for precise analysis of the physician's performance, and thus to fortify a natural
hesitancy to face up to the possibility of serious error." 1 D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, supra
note 3, at 205.
104. See generally L. REGAN, DOCTOR AND PATIENT AND THE LAW 312 (4th ed. 1962); J.
RICHARDSON, supra note 98, § 1.1ld, at 25.
105. See Belk v. Schweizer, 268 N.C. 50, 149 S.E.2d 565 (1966); Moulton v. Huckleberry,
150 Ore. 538, 46 P.2d 589 (1935).
106. 135 P.2d 606 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1943).
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the patient had eaten moldy bologna the day before, ptomaine
poisoning was diagnosed. A subsequent discovery of gas in the
abdomen and intestines was a further indication of ptomaine poisoning.
This diagnosis was concurred in by another examining physician. The
court held no liability because the plaintiff's evidence did not prove that
there was a failure to exercise ordinary care, diligence and skill in
making the diagnosis. Since there was reasonable doubt as to the
nature of the physical conditions involved,' °7 this was found to be a
mistake in judgment.
The evidence in Ries v. Reinard'08 showed that the customary
practice of physicians in the defendant's community for diagnosing
gonorrhea is to use either the methylene blue test or the gram negative
stain test. The defendant used the blue test to diagnose the plaintiff's
condition, and since this is acceptable practice, the court found no
liability. The doctor had relied on his judgment to select one of the two
accepted diagnostic procedures.
The most likely area in which to find negligence during the
diagnostic stage is where the physician fails to exercise reasonable care
in the procedures used to discover the patient's condition from physical
evidence and symptoms. If there is in fact negligence, the courts should
not be permitted to pass it off as a mere error in judgment. For
example, in Moulton v. Huckleberry"°9 the plaintiff severed a tendon in
her leg. This condition was not discovered by the doctor who failed to
perform the simple and well-known test of having the patient straighten
her leg. In holding for the plaintiff, the court noted that often mistake
of judgment is broadly applied to relieve the doctor from liability, but
this defense is subject to the limiting factors discussed above. Here the
doctor was negligent in his failure to inform himself. Perhaps the same
conclusion should have been reached in Domina v. Pratt"° where the
condition of the defendant's diabetic patient was diagnosed as a
diabetic coma when in fact it was insulin shock, which is a reaction to
an excess of insulin. The defendant compounded the problem by
repeated administrations of additional insulin. The court held in favor
of the doctor on the grounds of a mere error of judgment.
One source on which the doctor relies to diagnoge the patient's
107.
108.

See Engle v. Clarke, 346 S.W.2d 13 (Ky. 1961).
47 Cal. App. 2d 116, 117 P.2d 386 (1941).

109.

150 Ore. 538, 46 P.2d 589 (1935). See also Fornter v. Koch, 272 Mich. 273, 261 N.W.

762 (1935) (defendant's mistake of judgment held to have been due to his failure to use the local

customary procedure in diagnosing the plaintiff's condition).
110.

111 Vt. 166, 13 A.2d 198 (1940).
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problem is the patient himself or a member of the patient's family.",
The question arises as to how much the doctor can rely on such
statements. In Riggs v. Christie"2 the patient developed high
temperature and abdominal pains after returning home from the
hospital where an appendectomy had been performed. It was held that
the doctor was not negligent in failing to visit the patient immediately
when called because from the symptoms given over the telephone by
the patient's parents, the doctor was unable to diagnose the trouble as
peritonitis. In Foose v. Haymond 3 an action was brought by a woman
against a doctor who failed.to diagnose her injured heel as a fracture.
The plaintiff alleged negligence on the part-of the doctor for not using
an X-ray to diagnose the condition of her foot. The doctor's defense
was mistake of judgment in that he did not suspect a fracture from the
facts given by the patient. On appeal from trial court's judgment for
the doctor, the appellate court granted a new trial saying that in order
for the mistake of judgment defense to prevail, the evidence must show
that the physician used reasonable care in exercising that judgment.
The point of these and other cases is that there are many possibilities
for negligent error during the diagnostic stage, and the wholesale
application of the mistake of judgment defense should be avoided. The
physician's conduct should be subjected to careful scrutiny to establish
the presence or absence of the factors upon which mistake of judgment
must depend.
2. Treatment.-As in the diagnostic stage, the possibilities for
negligent conduct during treatment are present, but mistake of
judgment is widely used to excuse defendant doctors from liability. The
validity of the defense should be contingent on the presence of a split
in recognized medical authority as to the proper treatment to be used.
For example, in Scott v. McPeters"4 it was alleged that a physician was
negligent in the use of metal clamps and forceps incident to the delivery
of a child who was seriously injured by this procedure. The court
dismissed on another ground but said: "We do not even suggest the
defendant in this case is guilty of malpractice. Mere mistakes in the
judgment of the physician do not constitute malpractice." ' 5 While the
result may be proper in Scott, the danger of such an attitude is that
I 11.

In Oftedal v. Calaway, 135 P.2d 606 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1943), the doctor was told

that the patient had eaten moldy bologna the previous day.
112. 342 Mass.402, 173 N.E.2d 610 (1961).
113. 135 Colo. 275, 310 P.2d 722 (1957).
114. 33 Cal. App. 2d 629,92 P.2d 678 (1939).
115. Id. at 637, 92 P.2d at 683.

VANDERBILT LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 23

negligerit conduct is often overlooked by courts anxious to apply
mistake of judgment. There are, of course, cases where there is no
negligent treatment and the mistake of judgment defense should protect
the doctor. One such case is Costa v. Regents of University of
California"6 where the patient had cancer of the tongue which was
treated with X-rays that damaged bone in his mouth. It was alleged
that the X-ray treatment was too drastic and the damage could have
been avoided if surgery had been used instead. In holding for the doctor
the court said that in fighting dangerous conditions, physicians must
rely on their judgment and decide what risks are warranted. To hold
them liable for unfortunate results may deter the doctor from acting
in the way that gives the patient the best chance of survival." 7 Had the
plaintiff been able to show that good practice dictated a less drastic
procedure or that the defendant was negligent in not using a device to
protect other areas of the mouth, the outcome would probably have
been different.
C. Mistake of Judgment Summary
The physician is allowed a wide range in the reasonable exercise
of judgment while dealing with his patients.1 8 He is not liable for an
error in judgment where there is reasonable doubt as to the proper
course to be followed, or where good judgments may differ. The
reference standard is the accepted medical practice in the applicable
geographical area. Although the physician has broad discretionary
powers during the diagnosis and treatment process, negligent acts can
and do take place. These acts must not be whitewashed with
unwarranted use of the mistake of judgment notion. The courts must
carefully analyze cases in which the defendant has raised mistake of
judgment as a defense. The mistake of judgment element of the medical
standard of care is needed, but only if it is applied properly.
V.

CONCLUSION

The judiciary plays an important role in the field of medical
malpractice. We have seen examples of decisions in the areas of the
locality rule, customary practice, and mistake of judgment. More and
more courts are recognizing that the original reasons for the locality
116.
117.

116 Cal. App. 2d 445, 254 P.2d 85 (1953).

Id. at457,254 P.2dat93.
118. See, e.g., Schueler v. Strelinger, 43 N.J. 330, 204 A.2d 577 (1964); Willard v. Hutson,
234 Ore. 148, 378 P.2d 966 (1963); Christian v. Galutia, 236 S.W.2d 177 (Jex. Civ. App. 1951).
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rule no longer exist, and they are applying a variety of modified and
new reference standards. These standards will still be governed by the
practices adopted by the medical profession. We have seen, however,
that some courts are making the customary practice standard only one
circumstance to be considered rather than the conclusive one. It-is also
urged that mistake of judgment be utilized only after a close
examination of the physician's conduct shows an honest mistake of
judgment and not negligence. These changes will militate toward
improvement in medical practice throughout the country and toward
more equitable treatment of both doctors and patients in the courts of
law.
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